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NOTE
Peaceful Picketing and the Constitutional Guarantee of Free Speech
Since the Swing Case
Previous to 1937 the law of peaceful picketing in labor disputes was
largely a problem of social justification for harm done. The interest of
the picketing union in attaining their objective, the interest of the person
or group harmed, and the interest of society in the result were usually con-
sidered in deciding whether or not the objective was proper. If held
improper, then such picketing was not justified, was unlawful, and could
be enjoined.1
The legality of any particular objective was at first determined by the
state courts, each developing its own common law on peaceful picketing
in labor disputes. Some states in recent years have attempted to limit the
power of the judiciary to enjoin in "labor disputes" by passing anti-
injunction statutes.2  Their effectiveness as a limitation on state judicial
power has been cut into by judicial interpretation of their meaning and
scope." The New York Court of Appeals, for example, has recently con-
strued a statute which forbids injunctions in "labor disputes" so that there
can only be a "labor dispute" where the objective of the union is a lawful
one, e. g., where the objective bears a reasonable relation to wages, hours,
health, safety, the right of collective bargaining or some other condition of
employment.4 In other words, the statute only applies where the activity
was privileged under the common law.5
The first real inroad on the power of the state judiciary to enjoin in
labor disputes was the federal anti-injunction statute (The Norris-La
Guardia Act) 6 which was applicable only to "labor disputes" in interstate
commerce. This along with the National Labor Relations Act 7 clearly
marked the beginning of national control over labor disputes and collective
bargaining in industries concerned with or affecting interstate commerce.
The federal courts not only have the power to interpret the meaning and
scope of what constitutes a "labor dispute," but also have the power to
define the limits of interstate, as distinguished from intrastate, commerce.
The power of a state, however, to define the lawful ambit of labor activity
in purely intrastate industries seemed to remain intact.
The opening wedge of federal judicial supervision of the permissible
limits of intrastate labor activity was a dictum in a 1937 United States
I. FRANwKnRTER AND GREENi, THE LABOR INJUNCriON (1930) 26-31; TELLER,
LABOR DISPUTS AND CoLLECIrvE BARGAINING (1940) §§ 73, 109-137; RESTATEMENT,
ToRrs (1939) §§775-816.
2. A partial list of such statutes can be found in RESTATEMEnT, TORTS (1939) § 813,
statutory note; Cooper, The Fiction. of Peaceful Picketing (1936) 35 Mica. L. REv.
73, n. I.
3. 2 TEmLER, op. cit. supra note I, § 445; (1939) 7 INT. JURID. ASs'N BuLL. ior.
4. People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941); American Guild
of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 286 N. Y. 226, 36 N. E. (2d) 123 (1941); Opera on
Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (941), 9o U. oF PA. L. REv.
log; Tlw Court of Appeals Faces the Constitution (1941) Io INT. JuRID. Ass'x
BuLL. 9.
5. See (1941) 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1o9, IIo.
6. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § ioi et seq. (Supp. 1940). The Clayton
Act should also be mentioned in this connection. 38 STAT. 738 (I914), 29 U. S. C. A.
§ 52 (1927).
7. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-66 (Supp. 194o).
(201)
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Supreme Court decision 8 where the right of peaceful picketing was identi-
fied with the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. And in 194o a
state statute and a similar county ordinance banning all picketing of an
employer's place of business were struck down by the Supreme Court as
unconstitutional abridgments of the right of free speech." Recent cases
holding similar statutes unconstitutional are in accord.10
Moreover, in February 1941 the Supreme Court again identified
peaceful picketing with the right of free speech in American Federation of
Labor v. Swing." The common law policy of the state forbidding peaceful
picketing where there is no immediate employer-employee dispute was held
to violate the constitutional guarantee of free speech.' 2  The Court said,
inter alia,
"That a state has ample power to regulate the local problems thrown
up by modern industry and to preserve the peace is axiomatic. But
not even these essential powers are unfettered by the requirements of
the Bill of Rights. The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not
confined by the notion of a particular state regarding the wise limits
of an injunction in an industrial dispute, whether those limits be
defined by statute or judicial organ of the state. . . . The right of
free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to
workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not in
his employ. Communication by such employees of the facts of a dis-
pute, deemed by them to be relevant to their interests, can no more
be barred . . . than could the utterance protected in Thornhill's
Case." '
Thus the common law of the states for the first time was subjected to judi-
cial review by the United States Supreme Court. Did the Court thereby
intend to assume the power to remold the states' common law of labor dis-
putes by conveniently making peaceful picketing a phase of free speech?
At the same time the Supreme Court in Milk Wagon Drivers Union
of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 4 held that in cases where
picketing is set in a background of violence, a state has the power to author-
ize its courts 15 to issue a blanket injunction against all picketing if they
decide that such a remedy is necessary to prevent future violent conduct.
8. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468, 478 (1937), (1940) i
BiLL OF RIGHTS RzV. 59.
9. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (294o), i BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 59; Carl-
son v. California, 310 U. S. io6 (294o) ; Note (194) 41 CoL. L. REV. 89.
io. Culinary Workers and Bartenders Local v. Busy Bee Cafe, 115 P. (2d) 246
(Ariz., 194) ; Commonwealth v. Pascone, 308 Mass. 591, 33 N. E. (2d) 522 (i941).
See i TELLER, op. cit. supra note Y, §§ 138, 139.
II. 312 U. S. 321 (1941), 89 LU. OF PA. L. REV. 825, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 231,
29 GEo. L. J. 796, 54 HARv. L. Rav. io66.
12. It is to be noted that the result of the Swing case is accord with the meaning
given the term "labor dispute" by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70, § 13 (c)
(1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (9) (Supp. 1940). The Washington statute is similar.
8 WASH. REV. STAT. (Remington, Supp. 1940) tit. 50, § 7612-13 (c).
13. 312 U. S. 321, 325 (1941). The court also said at 325: "All that we have
before us, then, is an instance of 'peaceful persuasion' disentangled from violence and
free from 'picketing en mvasse or otherwise conducted' so as to occasion 'imminent and
aggravated danger.' Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 105. We are asked to sus-
tain a decree which for purposes oE this case asserts as the common law of a state that
there can be no 'peaceful picketing or peaceful persuasion' in relation to any dispute
between an employer and a trade union unless the employer's own employees are in
controversy with him."
14. 312 U. S. 287 (I940), I BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 217, 41 CoL. L. REV. 727, 54
HA v. L. REv. io64.
15. 312 U. S. 287, 292 (94).
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Of course, the finding that a blanket injunction was necessary, must be
fortified by the fact.16  The court said, inter alia: 17
"We are here concerned with power and not the wisdom of its exer-
cise. We merely hold that in the circumstances of the record before
us the injunction authorized by the supreme court of Illinois does not
transgress its constitutional power. That other states have chosen a
different path in such a situation indicates differences of social view
in a domain in which the states are free to shape their local policy.
. . . To maintain the balance of our federal system . . . , demands
at once zealous regard for the guaranties of the Bill of Rights and due
recognition of the powers belonging to the states."
A first impression might be that the Swing case had invoked the power
of the Supreme Court to overrule local policy while the Meadowmoor case
limited the power to do so. But the former case involved purely peaceful
picketing disentangled from violence. The two cases may therefore be dis-
tinguished on their facts, but may still be inconsistent in their purported
demarcation of state power.
To allow a blanket injunction of all picketing might at first blush give
the states a power fraught with danger of abuse. In the words of a leading
periodical, commenting on the Meadowmoor case, the decision "laid down
a rule which permits unjustifiable abridgement of freedom of expression." 1s
And in another, "The wisdom of removing the arm of the Supreme Court
from the evaluation of such state action is highly questionable." 19
Fuel was then added to the fire when Mr. justice Frankfurter in the
majority opinion of the Meadowmoor case cited and-approved a quotation
from an earlier Supreme Court decision, Thornhill v. Alabama'20 where
the same court had said, "The power and the duty of the State to take ade-
quate steps to preserve the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives and
the property 21 of its residents cannot be doubted." 22 This statement is preg-
nant with the danger that state courts might construe it to mean that they
could declare peaceful picketing unlawful as a matter of local policy if an
invasion of a property right was the inevitable result of permitting such
activity.
2
The Supreme Court's more recent decision in Journeymen Tailors
Union v. Miller's, Inc. 24 reversed without opinion an injunction of a state
court given in a fact situation similar to that in the Swing case. The
Swing, Thornhill, and Carlson cases, but not the Meadowmoor case, were
cited. The only other decided case was Bakery Drivers & Helpers Union
V. Wohl,25 which case has just been assigned for reargument in the present
term.26 Furthermore, the two cases denied certiorari in the present term
16. Id. at 293.
17. Id. at 296.
18. (1941) 41 COL. L. Rav. 727, 728; see also (1941) 54 H~Av. L. REv. 1O64,
1o66.
19. (1941) x BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 217, 221.
20. 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
21. Italics supplied.
22. 310 U. S. 88, 105 (1940).
23. See the cases collected in note 44 infra.
24. 312 U. S. 658 (1941), reversing, Miller's Inc. v. Journeymen Tailors Union,
128 N. J. Eq. 162, 15 A. (2d) 824 (1940).
25. 313 U. S. 548 (1941). The full text of the Court's opinion was as follows:
"The petition for rehearing is granted. The order denying certiorari is vacated
and the petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is reversed.
American Federation of Labor v. Swing . .. ."
26. IO U. S. L. WEEK 3132 (U. S. 1941).
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do not indicate anything of import because in both the federal question was
not necessarily decided below.27 So the problems created by the Swing
and Meadowmoor cases still remain unanswered. The opportunity for
clarification is at hand.
The scope of this note must therefore be limited to an analysis of deci-
sions in those state and lower federal courts which have had occasion to
adjudicate the problem of -picketing since the Swing and Meadowmoor
cases. This note will attempt to analyze the state courts' interpretation
and application of these two cases in the various factual situations that
have come up; and to tabulate the changes, if any, in this field of labor law.
Before proceeding to the examination of cases there are certain ques-
tions to bear in mind.
i) Does the identification of peaceful picketing with free speech nec-
essarily eliminate the more or less accepted theory of social
justification?
2) If so, can a union picket for any purpose whatsoever? Or will
other rights or powers guaranteed by the Constitution be held of
equal or paramount importance?
3) Should the same constitutional immunity be extended to other
forms of concerted labor activity?
4) How far should the Supreme Court extend the doctrine of judi-
cial review of state policy? What of the powers reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment?
5) If an employer's federal privilege of free speech can be limited or
restricted by a federal duty imposed on him under a federal power,
can the employee's federal privilege of free speech be limited or
restricted by a state duty imposed on him under a power expressly
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment? 28
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THiE LAW
The effect of the identification of picketing with free speech on the law
as it was prior to the Swing and Meadowmoor cases has not been uniform.
Where the courts 29 can use the doctrine to support legal conclusions which
are consistent with their old law, they do so,3° and there is no difficulty.
27. Springfield, Ohio, Local No. 352, etc. v. Settos, io U. S. L. WEEK 313o
(U. S. 1941); Weber v. Opera on Tour, Inc., Io U. S. L. W=EK 3117 (U. S. 1941).
28. Under the power of the Federal Government over interstate commerce, the
National Labor Relations Board in administering the National Labor Relations Act
has limited the employer's right. of free speech. In N. L. R. B. v. Federbush, 121
F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 2d, 194), Judge Learned Hand says at 957:
"Arguments by an employer directed to his employees have such an ambivalent
character; they are legitimate enough as such, and pro lanto the privilege of free
speech protects them; but, so far as they also disclose his wishes, as they generally
do, they have a force independent of persuasion. The Board is vested with power
to measure these two factors against each other, a power whose exercise does not
trench on the First Amendment. .... "
Similarly where a man has no employees it can be said that such picketing can have
a force independent of persuasion for a small business man may not have the finan-
cial resources of a strong union. If so, the problem again is one of state power
and the right of free speech. Can the state measure and regulate in order to main-
tain a healthy balance between the rights here involved? See also N. L. R. B. v.
Ford Motor Company, 114 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 6th, I94O), cert. denied, 61 Sup.
Ct. 621 (1941). With which ciompare Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v.
Milk & Ice Cream Drivers and :Dairy Employees Union, 299 N. W. 31 (Wis., 1941).
29. The use of the term "courts" for the sake of brevity will mean the state
and lower federal courts.
3o. This is also true in cases where the court is not too certain that the anti-
injunction statute includes within its ban the controversy in question. See People v.
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But where a case may call for a reversal of former rules of law, difficulties
arise. Here the courts have not always been in accord with each other.
Nevertheless in a number of instances dearly requiring a change of
existing law, the courts seem to have agreed. For example, a few juris-
dictions have hitherto declared any picketing illegal per se on the theory
that it was impossible for picketing to be peaceful.81 Such a doctrine will
now be discarded. Picketing if peaceful is now a right guaranteed by the
Constitution. The State of Washington, once holding peaceful picketing
illegal per se, has rejected the concept, and now recognizes that peaceful
picketing is lawful.8 2
Picketing by an outside union where the employer has no dispute with
his immediate employees was formerly held to be unlawful by fourteen of
the nineteen states which had adjudicated the problem.3" The rule was
often referred to as the "no strike, no picketing rule". The Swing case
clearly held that this rule violated the workingman's right of free speech, 4
and in all recent decisions in which this situation is involved, the state
courts have followed the Swing case.85 Therefore, the necessity of deter-
mining when a strike exists is now done away with.86
For the benefit of those who expressed a fear that allowing a state the
power to issue a blanket injunction against all picketing where the situation
warranted it, would permit an "unjustifiable abridgement of freedom of
Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941). And even where the statute does
not include the controversy within its ban of the remedy of an injunction, the courts
will refuse an injunction if they decide that to grant it would violate the defendant's
right of free speech, notwithstanding the statute. The statutes are not held to be
exclusive. Culinary Workers and Bartenders Local Union v. Busy Bee Cafe, 115 P.
(2d) 246 (Ariz. 194); The 2o63 Lawrence Ave. Bldg. Corp. v. Van Heck, 377 Ill.
37, 35 N. E. (2d) 373 (1941) ; Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago,
377 Ill. 76, 35 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941) ; Newark Milk & Cream Co. v. Milk Drivers &
Dairy Employees Local, 1g A. (2d) 232 (N. J. Ch. 1941); Alliance Auto Service,
Inc. v. Cohen, Ig A. (2d) 152 (Pa. 1941). But cf. Davis v. Yates, 32 N. E. (2d) 86
(Ind. 194) (not deciding the question where no labor dispute is involved).
31. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 2o5 (1921)
(wherein Chief Justice Taft said in effect that the phrase "peaceful picketing" was a
contradiction in terms); FaxrAN.ruarm AND GREEN, THE LmAoR IxJuxcTioN (1930)
2; I TEU.ER, op. cit. mpra note i, § II2; see cases cited in i Bi.L OF RiGHTS REV.
217, 218, n. 6.
32. O'Neil v. Bldg. Service Employees International Union, II5 P. (2d) 662
(Wash. 1941); Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union, 113 P. (2d) 28 (Wash. 1941);
Sears v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 112 P. (2d) 85o (Wash 1941).
With these cases compare Danz v. American Federation of Musicians, 133 Wash.
186, 233 Pac. 63o (1925).
33. I TELLER, op. cit. supra note I, § 117 at p. 357, § 1IS.
34. (94) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 825.
35. Heine's, Inc. v. Truck Drivers' and Helpers' Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 388, I9
A. (2d) 204 (94) (holding that the no strike, no picketing rule is no longer law
under the Swinhg case) ; ef. Heine's, Inc. v. Truck Drivers' and Helpers' Union, 127
N. J. Eq. 514, 14 A. (2d) 262 (1940). See also Lora Lee Dress Co. v. International
Ladies' Garment Workers Union, 829 N. J. Eq. 368, ig A. (2d) 659 (i94i). The cases
usually cite the Swing case as controlling. Los Angeles County Fair Association v.
Pomona Valley Central Labor Council, 9 LAn. REr. REI'. 17 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1940)
(held to be a lawful exercise of the right of free speech; Swing case not cited)
McReynolds v. Machinists Union, 8 LAB. REL. REP. 403 (Cal. Super. Ct. I941)
(Swing case cited as controlling) ; Chrisnan v. Culinary Workers' Local Union, 115
P. (2d) 553 (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App. 1941) ("a right of free speech"), with which
compare Smith Metropolitan Market v. Lyons, (1937) I2 CAB.. STATE BJR 3. 203 (Cal.
Super. 194I); Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., 286 Ky. 657, I51 S. W. (2d) 44o
(194), with which compare Hotel, Restaurant, etc., Local Union v. Miller, 272 Ky.
466, n4 S. W. (2d) 501 (1938). See the dissenting opinion in Sears v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 112 P. (2d) 85o, 854 (Wash. i94i). But cf. majority
opinion in the same case.
36. I TELLa, op. cit. mtpra note i, §§ 117, 136 at p. 432.
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expression," 87 it is interesting to note that in the recent cases involving
picketing in a background oE violence no court has found it necessary to
issue a blanket injunction.8 Two recent Illinois cases '9 refused to issue
just such an injunction. It was a blanket injunction issued by an Illinois
court which was permitted in the Meadowmoor case.
40
The cases of greater interest are those in which there is no "labor dis-
pute" under the local anti-injunction statute and/or where the object or
the means of the picketing union would have been considered unlawful
under the law of that state. In adjudicating controversies involving a pos-
sible conflict of state law with the Swing and/or Meadowmoor decisions,
the courts' interpretations and applications of those cases as being the law
can be divided into four categories.
The first category is those cases in which the courts rely on an inter-
pretation of the Meadowmoor case which will hereafter be referred to as
the theory of the Meadowmoor case. This is merely a convenient classifi-
cation and is not necessarily the correct rationalization of that case. These
courts interpret the Meadowmoor case to mean that a state has power to
determine whether and in what situations picketing as a right of free
speech can be allowed. Quick to note the Supreme Court's citation of a
statement in the Thornhill case to the effect that a state has power to pre-
serve the peace and protect the privacy, the lives and the property of its
residents, these courts have deduced that a state can limit the right to picket
in a peaceful manner as a phase of free speech if the object of the picketing
union is unlawful. The object may be unlawful if it is, in the legislature's
opinion or theirs, an unjustifiable interference with another's property
right. Or the object may be unlawful if there is no "labor dispute" as
they may define it. This interpretation obviously does not give full effect
to the identification of picketing with the right of free speech.
This is tantamount to a restatement of the law of picketing prior to
the Swing and Meadowmoor cases. The reasoning appears circuitous, but
seems to be a possible result of the principles laid down in the Meadow-
moor case which in allowing a qualification and constriction of this right in
certain given fact situations, stressed the importance of maintaining the
balance between federal and state power. It does, however, completely dis-
regard the plain meaning of the Swing case and, significantly enough, these
courts either fail to mention that case or distinguish it as being limited to
the factual situation there involved. An excellent example of this approach
is the case of Borden Company v. Local No. 133 of International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America,41 in
which the Texas Court of. Civil Appeals first interprets the Swing case to
mean:
37. (94) 41 COL. L. REv. 727, 728.
38. Chrisman v. Culinary Workers' Local Union, 115 P. (2d) 553 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
of App. 1941); White Cab Co. v. Chauffeurs' Local, 8 LAB. Pin. REP'. 578 (Cal.
Super. 1941); East Lake Drug Co. v. Pharmacists and Drug Clerks' Union, 298
N. W. 722 (Minn. 1941) ; Miller v. Gallagher, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 6o6 (Sup. Ct. 1941)
(blanket injunction expressly refused; cites and approves the Meadownwor case but
says that situation is not the one here) ; Lilly Dache, Inc., v. Rose, 28 N. Y. S. (2d)
303 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Bushell v. Zukor, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 79 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; People
v. Levner, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 25, 1941, p. 745, col. 4 (decision of a magistrate's court) ;
Lesaius v. International Alliance, Phila. Leg. Int., July 17, 1941, p. 87, col. 3 (Pa.
C. P. 194) (no mention of free speech) ; Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v.
Milk & Ice Cream Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, 299 N. W. 31 (Wis. 1941).
39. The 2o63 Lawrence Ave. Bldg. Corp. v. Van Heck, 377 Ili. 37, 35 N. E. (2d)
373 (1941); Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, 377 Ill. 76, 35
N. E. (2d) 349 (1941).
40. 312 U. S. 287, 291 (ig4i).
41. 152 S. W. (2d) 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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". .. in absence of criminal acts or other conduct prohibited by the
statutes of a state, a union cannot be enjoined from picketing the place
of business of an employer, with whom it is seeking to contract for its
members, upon the sole ground that there is no labor dispute between
the employer and his employees" 
42
and then that the Meadowmoor case means:
". .. the right of free speech is not unlimited but that, under a
proper state of facts, state courts are vested with authority to enjoin
picketing by a labor organization in protecting the rights of its citizens
where such picketing is 'enmeshed' with violence, or where it involves
such conduct as the state is authorized to declare unlawful, or the
breach of such laws as are necessary for the protection and welfare
of its residents." 48
A reluctance to give up powers once possessed and/or a conviction that
one's judgment is as good if not better than another's may well be the
motivating force behind these decisions."
The second category, hereinafter to be referred to as the theory of the
Swing case, is those cases in which the courts have given what might be
said to be the full effect to the plain and simple meaning of the Swing case,
e. g., a true identification of peaceful picketing with the right of free speech.
They tend to limit the Meadowmoor case to the situation there involved-
to cases of violence and other conduct constituting a clear and present dan-
ger to the public peace. Some have failed to cite this case or comment
on it.
Under this view there is no longer any necessity of proving justifica-
tion for harm done. The picketing must be peaceful." The objective
sought need not be tested in order to determine the legality of the right.
In Blanford v. Press Publishing Company,46 the Kentucky Court cited the
Swing case and said the right of free speech is all the justification necessary
for the conduct there in question.
The third category will comprise those cases 47 in which the courts
have tried to take a middle position, between what has been described as
42. Id. at 833.
43. Ibid.
44. Cases in this category are: Lyons v. United Hotel Employees, 9 LAB. REL.
RP. 45 (Cal. Super. I94I); McReynolds v. Machinists Union, 8 LAB. REL. REP. 403
(Cal. Super. I94I); Miller v. Gallagher, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 6o6 (Sup. Ct. 1941)
(cites and relies on Meadowmoor case but fails to mention Swbtg case) ; Petrucci v.
Hogan, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 718 (Sup. Ct. 194); Carpenters and Joiners Union of
America v. Ritter's Cafe, I49 S. W. (2d) 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), cert. granted,
io U. S. L. WEEK 3111 (U. S. 194); Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v.
Milk and Ice Cream Drivers and Dairy Employees Union, 299 N. W. 31 (Wis. 1941);
see Davis v. Yates, 32 N. E. (2d) 86, 87 (Ind. 1941) ; People v. Muller, 286 N. Y.
281, 285, 36 N. E. (2d) 2o6, 207 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
45. East Lake Drug Co. v. Pharmacists and Drug Clerks' Union, 8 LAB. Rm.
REP. 692 (Minn. 1941) Blonder v. United Retail Employees of Newark, 129 N. J.
Eq. 424, i9 A. (2d) 786 (941); Feller v. Local 44, Internat'l Ladies Garment
Workers Union, 129 N. 1. Eq. 421, ig A. (2d) 784 (ig4i); Friedman v. Blumberg,
21 A. (2d) 41 (Pa. I94I).
46. 286 Ky. 657, 15i S. W. (2d) 440 (1941).
47. Rebard v. John Breuner Co. of San Francisco, 9 LAB. REL. REP. 154 (Cal.
Super. 1941) (A declaratory judgment was refused in so far as it would constitute a
previous restraint on peaceful picketing) ; Los Angeles County Fair Ass'n v. Pomona
Valley Central Labor Council, 9 LAB. REL. REP. 17 (Cal. Super. I94i) ; Blanford v.
Press Pub. Co., 286 Ky. 657, i5 S. W. (2d) 440 (941) ; Lora Lee Dress Co. v.
Internat'l Ladies Garment Workers Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 368, I9 A. (24d) 659 (941) ;
Heine's, Inc., v. Truck Drivers' and Helpers' Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 388, I9 A. (2d)
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the theory of the Meadowmoor case and the theory of the Swing case.
They cite the Swing case as controlling authority for denying an injunction
but at the same time indicate, without detailed rationale and without cita-
tion of the Meadowmoor case, that in other situations, not necessarily
adjudicated here, concerted labor activity may be such as to warrant an
injunction. But at the same time, they do not adopt the theory of the
Meadowmoor case, but restrict the meaning of that case to its facts. This
hesitation to go forward may well result from their confusion as to what
the Supreme Court intended or because of an inner hope that there may be
some way of circumventing the plain and simple meaning of the Swing
case.
The fourth category is those cases 48 in which the courts have gone
beyond the Swing case by connecting constitutional guarantees with other
forms of concerted labor activity than picketing.
THE PARTICULAR CONTROVERSIES
The Place of Picketing
Should picketing be limited to the employer's place of business? In
the past, picketing the residence of an employer has usually been enjoined
as unlawful conduct.45 But in the case of picketing the homes of other
employees, 50 the authorities were divided. If picketing is a phase of the
right to free speech, then picketing of the home in either case may now be
allowed.
The recent cases do not indicate clearly what the effect of identifying
picketing with free speech will be. As to picketing the home of the
employer, the only case is People v. Levner 5 1- a New York Magistrate's
Court case. The defendants, members of a W. P. A. teachers union,
picketed the home of the Mayor of New York and were convicted of dis-
orderly conduct. Although there was no violence, the result may be recon-
ciled with the Meadowmoor case because the Magistrate found that the
large number of pickets and the crowd that was attracted constituted a
danger to the public peace.
There is still a conflict as to whether a union can picket the homes of
other employees. In Petrucci v. Hogan,5 2 the Bronx County Supreme
2o4 (i94i); Newark Milk and Cream Co. v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees
Local, i A. (2d) 232 (N. J. Ch. 1941) ; People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E.
(2d) 206 (ig4i) ; Alliance Auto Service, Inc., v. Cohen, 19 A. (2d) 152 (Pa. 1941) ;
O'Neil v. Bldg. Service Employees Internat'l Union, 115 P. (2d) 662 (Wash. 1941),;
Edwards v. Teamsters Local, 113 P. (2d) 28 (Wash. 1941); see Sears v. Internat'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America, 112 P.
(2d) 850, 854 (Wash. 1941) (dissenting opinion); Borden Co. v. Local, 152 S. W.
(2d) 828, 835 (Tex. Civ. App. i4i) (dissenting opinion).
48. Kingston Trap Rock Co. v. Local No. 825, 129 N. J. Eq. 570, i9 A. (2d) 661
(94) ; The 2063 Lawrence Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Van Heck, 377 Ill. 37, 35 N. E. (2d)
373 (941) ; Blanford v. Press Pub. Co., 286 Ky. 657, 151 S. W. (2d) 440 (94).
49. Miller v. Gallagher, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 606 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; State v. Cooper,
265 Minn. 333, 285 N. W. 903 (x939); Davis v. State, 2oo Ind. 88, 161 N. E. 365
(1925); Baltic Mining Co. v. Houghton, 177 Wis. 632, 144 N. W. 209 (1913).
5o. Picketing of residence of employee held ur.awful. Knudson v. Benn, 123
Fed. 636 (D. C. Minn. 19o3); State v. Perry, 196 Minn, 481, 265 N. W. 302 (1936);
Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail' Employees Union, 281 N. Y. 150, 22 N. E. (2d)
320 (1939); Christensen v. Kellogg, no Ill. App. 61 (1903); Wick China Co. v.
Brown, 164 Pa. 449, 3o Atl. 26K (1894). Contra: Iron Molders Union v. Allis
Chalmers, 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 7th, i9o8); Southern California v. Amalgamated
Ass'n, 186 Cal. 604, 200 Pac. 1 (192I); State Line Ry. Co. v. Brown, Ir Pa. Dist.
Rep. 509 (19O1).
5I. iO6 N. Y. L. J. Sept. 25, '[941, p. 746, col. 4 (decision of magistrate's court).
52. 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 718, 726 (Sup. Ct. 14i).
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Court of New York restrained a union from picketing the homes of other
employees as "involving a malicious intent to annoy and intimidate plain-
tiffs and their families." The case was decided on precedent. The doc-
trine of picketing as free speech was not analyzed. 58 But a New York
County Court in Miller v. Gallagher 54 refused to enjoin the union's picket-
ing of the homes of other employees. In discussing the right to picket as a
phase of free speech, the court said:
"It niay be there can be no bar to peaceful picketing of the homes of
employer or employees . . . there is no square Supreme Court
authority here for the right of peaceful picketing other than the
employees place of business."
None of these cases discuss the possibility that picketing of a home of
employer or employee may well be an invasion of that person's right of
privacy. That right is one of the exceptions mentioned in the Thornhilh
case and noted in the Meadowmoor case. But it must be borne in mind
that only the person whose home has been picketed could ask and secure
an injunction against the picketing of his home.
The Object of Picketing
First, can a union picket for a dosed or all-union shop? Where a
union is so picketing in conjunction with a strike, in the past injunctions
have been granted 5 or denied 56 depending upon the court's view of the
propriety and, hence, the legality of striking and picketing for an all-union
shop. Even in the absence of a strike, the authorities were divided. 57  But
where union membership was closed to outsiders, a strike or picketing by a
union for an all-union shop was usually enjoined.58
Since the Swing and Meadowmoor decisions, the courts uniformly
have refused to enjoin at the instance of the employers, picketing for an all-
union shop. This is true both in cases in which the picketing is in further-
ance of a strike 5' and in cases where the picketing is in absence of a strike.60
In these cases the question was not raised whether union membership was
open to outsiders. But where a non-union employee seeks the injunction
and/or the union membership is closed to strangers, picketing by that union
53. Ibid.
54. 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 6o6 (Sup. Ct. 194).
55. Sarros v. Nouris, I Del. Ch. 391, 138 At. 607 (1927); Barnes & Co. v.
Chicago Typographical Union, 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 940 (198o); Folsom Engraving
Co. v. McNeil, 235 Mass. 269, 126 N. E. 479 (192o) ; Elkind & Sons, Inc., v. Retail
Clerks Ass'n, 114 N. J. Eq. 568, i69 Atl. 494 (933); Freed & Co. v. Doe, 154
Misc. 644, 278 N. Y. Supp. 68 (1935) ; Cooks, Waiters and Waitresses Local Union v.
Papageorge, 230 S. W. io86 (Tex. Civ. App., 1921).
56. Weissman v. Jureit, 132 Fla. 661, 181 So. 898 (1938) ; Scofes v. Helmar, 2o5
Ind. 596, 187 N. E. 662 (i933).
57. See Keith Theater v. Vachon, 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692 (1936); Blakely
Laundry Co. v. Cleaners and Dyers Union, ii N. J. Misc. 915 (Ch. 1933). Contra:
S. A. Clark Lunch Co. v. Cleveland Waiters & Beverage Dispensers Local, 22 Ohio
App. 265, 154 N. E. 362 (1926).
58. Wilson v. Newspaper Union, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197 Atl. 720 (1938); Willis
v. Restaurant Employees, 26 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 435 (927) ; Dorrington v. Manning,
135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886 (1939) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1539) § 788(c).
59. Los Angeles County Fair Ass'n v. Pomona Central Labor Council, 9 LAB.
REz. RFP. 17 (Cal. Super. 1941); White Cab Co. v. Chauffers Local, 8 LAB. Rn..
REP. 578 (Cal. Super. 194i) ; Lora Lee Dress Co., Inc., v. Internat'l Ladies Garment
Workers Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 368, I9 A. (2d) 659 (94).
6o. Blanford v. Press Pub. Co., 286 Ky. 657, 15I S. W. (2d) 440 (94I) ; Heine's,
Inc., v. Truck Drivers and Helpers Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 3o8, i9 A. (2d) 204 (94I) ;
Friedman v. Blumberg, 21 A. (2d) 41 (Pa. 1941) ; East Lake Drug Co. v. Pharmacists
and Drug Clerks Union, 8 LAB. Rn. RE'. 692 (Minn. Sup. Ct. i941) semble.
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may still be enjoined. No recent case has decided this controversy either
way. The employee's right to a livelihood under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and/or the powers of a state reserved by the Tenth Amendment may
be considered of equal or paramount importance to another employee's
right to picket.61
Can a union picket for an objective which the employer is unable to
grant? This was the controversy in Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board v. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers and Dairy Employees Union.
62 Sec-
tion iii.o6 (i) (c) of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act appears to
make it an unfair labor practice for an employer to make an all-union
contract unless three-quarters of his employees voted for it.63 In this
case the defendant union failed to secure the necessary vote for an all-
union contract. Nevertheless, they continued picketing the employer to
induce him to give them such a contract. The board issued a cease and
desist order against picketing for that purpose on the ground that it is
an unfair labor practice for a union to induce an employer to do something
which would constitute an unfair labor practice on his part.6 4 The court
held that this order did not violate the free speech and press provisions of
the Constitution.6 5 They then argued the theory of the Meadowmoor case
which they say indicates that,
"there are limits beyond which the present court will not go to invali-
date police regulations of the state . . . and to reverse factual find-
ings of state courts under the common law." 66
The court also stated that we should not extend the rule of the Swing
case beyond the point at which the court itself stopped.
6 7
Related to the question of whether an employer can be picketed to do
something which he is not allowed by law to do, is the question whether a
union can picket an employer already under contract with a rival union.68
Is the inducement of an employer to breach his contract a lawful objective?
61. i TELLER, op. cit. su pra note I, § 98; (1941) 10 INT. JURID. Ass'N BuLu. 34.
If a closed shop contract under the particular circumstances is void under the common
law or by state statute as a restraint of trade, then what result? Compare Ware-
houseman's Union and McKesson and Robbins v. N. L. R. B., 8 LAB. REL. REP. 383
(App. D. C. i94i), cert. deizied, 9 LAB. REL. REP. 228 (U. S. I941), with F. F. East
Co. v. United Oysterman's Union, 9 LAB. RED. RE'. 176 (N. J. Errors and App. 1941).
62. 299 N. W. 311 (Wis. ig4i), 90 U. OF P. L. REv. 227, infra in this issue.
63. Wis. STAT. (5th ed. 1939) § iii.o6 (I) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer . . .:
(c) To encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . by
discrimination . . . ; provided, that an employer shall not be prohibited from en-
tering into an all-union agreement with the representatives of his employees in a
collective bargaining unit, where three-quarters or more of the employees in such
. . . unit shall have voted affirmatively . . . in favor of such all-union agree-
ment. .... "
64. Wis. STAT. (I5th ed. 1939) § III.o6 (3) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for any person to do or cause to be done . . . any act prohibited by subsections (I)
and (2) of this section."
65. § iii.o6 (2) (e) of this same Act (Wis. STAT., 15th ed. I939), making it an
unfair labor practice for employees to cooperate in picketing or boycotting unless a
majority of the employees have voted to call a strike, was held not to violate the con-
stitutional guarantee of free speech. Hotel and Restaurant Employees Internat'l
Alliance v. Wis. Employment Relations Board, 236 Wis. 329, 295 N. W. 634 (941).
Certiorari of that case has just been granted by the Supreme Court. 1o U. S. L.
WEEK 3111 (1941).
66. 299 N. W. 31, 38 (Wis. 1941).
67. Id. at 39.
68. Compare the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act which provides, inter alia, that
it would be an unfair labor practice for a minority union to induce an employer to
cancel an existing collective bargaining contract with a majority union. PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, i94I) tit. 43, §§ 211.6 (2), 211.7 (c).
In the past, the courts were not agreed as to whether or not that objec-
tive was lawful either in cases where the employer was seeking relief 69 or
where the employees or established union asked for an injunction.70  But
where a Labor Relations Act forbade an employer to make a contract
except with the union certified by the Labor Board, some courts tended to
deny an injunction before certification and 71 grant it after certification.
7 2
Since the Swing and Meadowmoor decisions, where the employee or
established union is suing, the courts in two cases have refused to enjoin
the rival union from picketing the employer. In these cases, there was
no question of certification. 78 In Montgomery Ward Employees Ass'n v.
Retail Clerks Int. Protective Ass'n,74 the court held that until certification
plaintiff-employees could not secure an injunction against defendant-
employees who were out on strike and were picketing the employer. The
rationale was that to enjoin before certification would interfere with the
defendant's right of free speech, and with the full development of the right
of selecting a bargaining agent.
By inference this same court said that after certification of one union
as bargaining agent, the rival minority union may be restrained from picket-
ing the employer for a bargaining agreement. But in Florsheim Shoe Store
Inc. v. Retail Salesman's Union,75 the New York Supreme Court, Appel-
late Division, held that even after certification the rival minority union could
not be enjoined on the suit of the certified majority union with whom the
employer had contracted, because a "labor dispute" still existed under the
New York Anti-Injunction statute. Free speech wasn't mentioned.
Where the employer sued, a California Superior Court refused to
restrain the picketing of the employer to compel him to cancel an all-union
contract with an independent union and execute one with the defendant
union.78 No question of certification was raised.
In any of these situations, the minority union may well be allowed to
picket the employer's place of business, not to breach an existing contract,
but in order to further the possibility of securing a contract upon the
expiration of the existing agreement.
The Nature of the Placard
Where the statements on the picketing union's placard are untruthful
or generally misleading, the person picketed was usually given injunctive
69. Glover v. Parson, 1O3 Ind. App. 561, 9 N. E. (2d) 109 (1937); Stillwell
Theatre Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932) ; Blanchard v. Golden Age
Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397 (1936). Contra: Goyette v. Watson, 245
Mass. 577, 14o N. E. 285 (1923). See Note (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 1200.
7o. Mackay v. Retail Automobile Salesman's Local Union, io6 P. (2d) 373 (Cal.
194o); Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 6go (1931). Contra: Plant v.
Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. i1i (19oo) ; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 AtI.
327 (1903).
71. Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union, 308 U. S. 522
(1939) (employee suing); Blankenship v. Kurfman, 96 F. (2d) 45o (C. C. A. 7th,
1938) (employee suing).
72. Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers, 21 F. Supp. 20 (W. D. Mo.
1937) (employer suing); Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v. International Wood-
workers, 4 Wash. (2d) 62, zO2 P. (2d) 270 (1940) (employer suing).
73. Rebard v. John Brenner Co. of San Francisco, 9 LAB. REL. REP. 154 (Cal.
Super. 1941) ; Davis v. Yates, 32 N. E. (2d) 86 (Ind. 1941).
74. 38 F. Supp. 32I (N. D. Cal. 1941).
75. 262 App. Div. 769, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 883 (2nd Dept. 1941).
76. Los Angeles County Fair Association v. Pomona Valley Central Labor Coun-
cil, 9 LAB. Ri. REP. 17 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1941).
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relief.77 The entrance of the doctrine of free speech has not changed this.
In Alliance Auto Service v. Cohen 7 where the injunction was refused by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the placard used in picketing the retailer
was truthful because it said that the employer-wholesaler was unfair. The
wholesaler was in fact involved in a dispute with the union. The Swing
case was cited as allowing the truthful and honest publication of the facts
of a labor dispute.
On the other hand in situations where the injunction was granted, the
placards have been false or misleading. By way of dicta the Pennsylvania
Court in the Alliance case held that the picketing union could not advertise
the retailer as unfair when in fact it was his wholesaler who was having the
dispute.79 The New York Supreme Court, in Coward Shoe Store, Inc. v.
Retail Shoe Salesman's Union,11 held that an A. F. of L. union having no
dispute with a C. I. 0. union's employer or any one connected with him
could not picket that employer as "unfair" to the A. F. of L. union when
the purpose of the picketing was to retaliate against the C. I. 0. union
employed by the plaintiff-employer. The court said, "Free speech does not
legalize untruth. Nor can the Constitution be invoked as a shield against
misrepresentation." 81
A recent California decision,8 2 however, refused to enjoin a union from
giving to the employees of the plaintiff's hotel circulars charging slave con-
ditions in the hotel; but by way of dicta the court said that it would enjoin
the giving of these circulars to customers of the hotel. The case is explained
by the fact that the employees would know the actual working conditions
so as to them the statements would be mere expressions of opinion. But
customers, not knowing the truth, would take the same declarations as
statements of fact.
And in the Wisconsin case discussed supra 8 3 where an employer was
forbidden by local statute to accede to the union's demand and where under
the same statute the union was ordered to cease picketing that employer as
"unfair", would the constitutional guarantee of free speech protect the
union's picketing the employer if the placards stated that the local statute
was unfair to organized labor? Or was unconstitutional? It seems that
this may be allowed.
Nature of the Employer
What is the effect of the fact that the state or a subdivision thereof is
the employer? Can a union picket a governmental body for an all-union
contract ?
The law of labor relations between the government and its employees
has been unique. State anti-injunction statutes and state labor relation
acts have been held inapplicable to disputes between a union and a govern-
77. Steinert v. Tagen, 2o7 Mass. 394, 93 N. E. 584 (1911) ; Edjomac Amusement
Corp. v. Empire State Motion Picture Operators' Union, Inc., 156 Misc. 856, 283
N. Y. Supp. 6 (935); Wilner v. Bless, 243 N. Y. 544, 154 N. E. 598 (1926). See i
TELLER, op. cit. stpra note 1; (936) 30 CoL. L. REv. 840.
78. i A. (2d) 152 (Pa. 1941):
79. Compare this dicta with the case of Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union
of Chicago, 377 Ill. 76, 35 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941). There the retailer was placarded
as "unfair" when the dispute was with his wholesaler. The court refused to enjoin,
but not on the ground of false or dishonest placarding. There was no mention of this
point.
8o. N. Y. L. J., Oct. 31, 1941, p. 1308, col. 7.
81. Id. at 1309, col. I.
82. Lyons v. United Hotel Employees, 9 LAB. REs- REP. 45, 46 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1941).
83. Page 210 supra.
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mental unit.84 The right of public employees to strike is not yet settled 85
and the validity of an all-union contract with the government is question-
able.8 , It may well be argued that an all-union contract given by the
state as an employer denies equal protection of the laws to workers not
members of the union.8 ' In this respect a stronger argument for unconsti-
tutionality of such a contract would arise where membership in the con-
tracting union is closed.
The identification' of picketing with free speech has not settled the
question. However, in Petrucci v. Hogan 88 the Bronx County Supreme
Court said that the allowance of such picketing as a right granted by the
Constitution presupposes a situation where the employer is free to make an
all-union contract. 8 In granting the injunction the court assumed that
the purpose of the subway employees' union in picketing other subway
employees to rejoin the union was unlawful in so far as their eventual aim
was to secure an all-union agreement with the city. This, they held, would
violate the Civil Service Law which regulates the terms and conditions of
employment of subway employees and would for that reason be repugnant
to the Constitution of New York, which guarantees to all "an equal oppor-
tunity of securing appointment." 1o The plaintiffs were subway employees
and former members of defendant union. They had resigned upon securing
civil service classification.
The court does not discuss the question of equal protection of the laws
as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. No mention is made of the
Swing or Meadowmoor cases or the recent development of the free speech
theory. The question thus remains unsettled.
Picketing a Sole Proprietor
The law had not been settled in regard to picketing a man who does
his own work and operates a business without outside help. This was true
whether the picketing was for the purpose of inducing him to join the
union, to conform to the union's labor policies, to take on an assistant, or
to agree to hire union labor if and when needed.
In every case since the Swing decision, however, the courts have
refused to enjoin such picketing.9 '
In O'Neil v. Building Service Employees International Union,92 the
Supreme Court of Washington refused to grant an injunction to an apart-
ment house proprietor who operated the apartments without any outside
help against a union of building service employees who were picketing the
84. Petrucci v. Hogan, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 718 (Sup. Ct. ig4i) ; Jewish Hospital v.
John Doe, 252 App. Div. 581, 30o N. Y. Supp. 1111 (2d Dep't. 1937); Western Penn-
sylvania Hospitals v. Lichliter, 340 Pa. 382, 17 A. (2d) 2o6 (ig4I), 89 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 11o3.
85. Public Employees Right to Strike, 9 LAB. REL. REP. 84 (1941). See also Note
(1941) 54 -axv. L. Rv. 1360, 1364.
86. Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, Feb. 28, I94O, 6 L". RE. REP. 83
(1940) ; 6 LAx. REL REP. 171 (1940).
87. Alston v. School Board, 112 F. (2d) 99N (C. C. A. 4th, 1940), cert. denied,
61 Sup. Ct. 75 (1940); Mills v. Board of Education, 3o F. Supp. 245 (D. C. Md.
1939). But cf. Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (1915).
88. 27 k. Y. S. (2d) 718 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
89. Id. at 726.
90. Id. at 727.
gi. Accord: Feinberg v. Pappas, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 5 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Coman v.
Osman, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 353 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Ruben v. Choina, 26 N. Y. S. (2d)
io (Sup. Ct. 1941); Neckritz v. Goldberg, 9 LAB. RET. REP. 243 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1941); Fromer v. Winokur, 8 LAB. Rm. RP. 556 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). None of
these cases, however, are decided on the basis of free speech.
92. 115 P. (2d) 662 (Wash. 1941).
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apartment in order to make her join the union. The opinion says that this
is the next logical step from the ruling in the Swing case. A strong dissent
disagrees on the ground that if this is the next logical step, then it might
easily follow that a union could picket anyone who might wish to do their
own work in order to force them to take on outside help.9 3 And he says,
"If that is to be the law, then I think that the time has arrived when we
should have a little less speech and more freedom." 94 No mention is made
of the Meadowmoor case.
The United States Supreme Court, in Bakery and Pastry Drivers
and Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl 5 reversed without opinion, but with the
single citation of the Swing case, the decision of the New York Court of
Appeals which had affirmed a lower court injunction.96 The plaintiffs were
peddlers in the business of buying baked food products from wholesalers
and selling them to retailers. Each owned his own truck and had no
employees. The defendant union threatened to picket both the wholesalers
and the retailers unless each of the plaintiffs employed a member of the
union one day a week to "assist".
In Friedman v. Blumberg,9 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused
an injunction where the union picketed a glazier who occasionally hired
outside help in order to induce him to agree to hire only union men. In
support of their conclusion, the Pennsylvania court cited the Wohl case. 98
These cases, then, might have been controlling authority but for the fact
that the United States Supreme Court has just granted reargument of the
Wohl case. 99
Picketing of Third Persons
Originally a union was not permitted to exert pressure on an employer
by picketing their patrons or suppliers.100 In recent years, however, the
law has developed to the point where neither the third party nor the
employer can obtain an injunction in most instances. 01 But it is to be
noted that there are three separate situations involved: I) where the per-
son picketed is in a position to advance the interest of the picketing union
and is legally privileged to do so; 2) where the third person is in a position
to advance the union's interest but cannot do so without incurring legal
responsibility; 3) where the person picketed is in no position to advance
the interest of the picketers. The third situation would arise where the
party picketed agrees not to deal in the future with the "unfair" supplier,
but does wish to dispose of the goods already on hand.
Since the Swing decision, three cases have refused an injunction at
the request of the third person who was able legally and factually to advance
the union's interest. In Alliance Auto Service, Inc. v. Cohen,10 2 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court refused to enjoin the picketing of a retailer who
sold the product of a wholesaler with whom the union had a dispute. The
Illinois Supreme Court in Ellingsen v. Milk Drivers Union of Chicago 103
93. Id. at 666.
94. Id. at 667.
95. 313 U. S. 548 (194).
96. 284 N. Y. 220, 31 N. E. (2d) 765 (1940).
97. 21 A. (2d) 41 (Pa. 194').
98. The Court of Appeals Faces the Constitution (1941) 10 INT. JRugD. Ass'N
BuuI. 9.
99. Reargument of this case granted, io U. S. L. WEEK 3129.
ioo. I TELLER, op. cit. supra note I, § 123 and cases there collected.
ioi. Ibid.; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) §§ 799, 801.
102. ig A. (2d) 152 (Pa. 1941) ; cf. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation v. Hamley,
3 Labor Cases 6o, 953 (Sup. Ct. Special Term, N. Y. County, 1941).
103. 377 Ill. 76, 35 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941).
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permitted a milk drivers' union to picket the retailers in order to compel
them to cease selling the products of a milk company which distributed
milk through a "vendor" system. In Lora Lee Dress Co., Inc. v. Interna-
tional Ladies Garment Workers Union, Local No. 85,104 the New Jersey
Court of Errors and Appeals refused to enjoin a union's picketing of a cor-
poration's place of business. The object of the picketing was to compel the
corporation to assist the union in its effort to secure an all-union contract
with that corporation's subsidiary, even though the subsidiary may be con-
sidered an independent company. In all three cases the Swing case was
cited as controlling.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, however, granted such an injunc-
tion in Borden Company v. Local No. 133 of International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen, and Helpers of America.05 The retail-
er's place of business was picketed by a union of milk drivers who were
involved in a dispute with the wholesaler. The injunction was granted
following the theory of the Meadowmoor case on the ground that such
picketing violated the state's anti-trust law.0 8 There was a dissent, how-
ever, on the basis of the Swing case.1
0 7
Where the person picketed could not grant the union's request with-
out incurring legal liability, the picketing has been enjoined. In Carpen-
ter's and Joiner's Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 08 a union picketed
the plaintiff's restaurant to induce him to break his contract with a con-
tractor for the erection of a building some twenty-four blocks away from
the restaurant. The union was involved in a controversy with the con-
tractor. The court rationalized their granting the injunction upon the
theory of the Meadownoor case.
But the New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Muller ' 0 9 refused
to enjoin an electrical workers' union from picketing the purchaser of a
burglar alarm system sold by a supplier with whom the union had a dis-
pute. Although the purchaser had an incidental agreement with the sup-
plier for maintenance and service of the burglar alarm system, the union
demanded that the purchaser obtain union service. The difference in result
between this and the Ritter's Cafe case may be reconciled by examining the
New York Court's opinion. The court did not decide the case on the basis
of the particular controversy there involved, but on the broad ground that
peaceful picketing "is the exercise of a right of free speech guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States." 10 The Swing and Wohl cases
were cited as controlling. Although it was stated as a fact that there was
an agreement between the purchaser and the supplier, the court does not
point out that the purchaser would have to breach that contract if he
granted the union's request.
No recent case was found in which the union's interest could not be
furthered by the person picketed, but the dissent in the Muller case 1
stated that the evidence indicated that no service had been made on the
burglar alarm system since its installation and that there was very little
104. 129 N. J. Eq. 368, ig A. (2d) 659 (1941).
l05. 152 S. W. (2d) 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
io6. The constitutionality of this law has been tested in the Supreme Court.
Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 (1940).
:07. 152 S. W. (2d) 828, 835 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
1o8. 149 S. W. (2d) 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)."
1o9. 36 N. E. (2d) 2o6 (N. Y. C. A. i941) (three judges dissented). See com-
ment on this case and the development of the law in New York in (1941) 10 INT.
JuRrD. Ass'N Bum. 9.
11o. Id. at 207.
ii. Ibid.
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likelihood of any servicing being needed in the future.112 In view of these
facts, the dissent argued that: this was a case involving the ultimate con-
sumer where "picketing would have no legitimate reason for existence
except as a form of punishment. No room exists for an act of persuasion
as in the case of a retail seller for profit." 113 The power of a state court
to enjoin picketing in this instance as an unprivileged invasion of the pur-
chaser's property right was argued by the dissent under the theory of the
Meadowmoor case.
Other Forms of Concerted Labor Activity
The cases so far examined deal with picketing as a form of concerted
action. Constitutional guarantees have been extended to other forms of
labor activity.
In Blanford v. Press Publishing Company 1 14 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals refused to enjoin a campaign in the nature of a secondary boycott.
The union published handbills, advertised in newspapers, and interviewed
the plaintiff's customers in a concerted action to force him to unionize his
shop. Although picketing itself does not seem to be involved at all, the
court did not recognize any difference between picketing and the activity
there conducted and used the Swing case as their authority.
In Kingston Trap Rock Co. v. Local No. 825,15 a strike was going on
in plaintiff's plant. In support of this strike, the defendant union, affiliated
with the striking union, refused to handle the materials and threatened
to withdraw the services of their members if the customer continued to
buy materials from plaintiff pursuant to their contract. The court refused
the plaintiff's request for an injunction. The Swing case is cited and then
the court says, inter alia, "This freedom of action respecting one's own
labor is no less sacred than the right of communication. Compulsory serv-
ice by members of the union to the employer's customer would constitute
an invasion of their inalienable constitutional rights; and the fact that the
refusal of service is the result of concert of action does not give it the taint
of an illegal conspiracy, for such combination is in the pursuit of a com-
mon objective deemed to be for the general good and welfare, and is there-
fore wholly lawful." 116
The court does not indicate clearly what this constitutional right is.
It is doubtful whether a right to conduct a secondary boycott or to strike
should be identified with the right of free speech. Perhaps the "freedom
of action" mentioned in this case better describes the sum total of personal
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
117
So the question remains whether other forms of concerted labor activity
will be protected by constitutional guarantees.1 18
112. Id. at 2o8.
113. Id. at 209.
114. 286 Ky. 657, 151 S. W. (2d) 440 (1941).
115. 129 N. J. Eq. 570, 19 A. (2d) 661 (194i).
116. Id. at 666.
117. CORWIN, THE CONSTrTTION AND WHAT IT ME-ANs TODAY (6th ed. 1938)
169 et seq.
II8. Accord, The 2063 Lawrence Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Van Heck, 377 Ill. 37, 35 N. E.
(2d) 373 (194) (secondary boycott; Swing case cited as controlling); Edwards v.
Teamsters Local Union, 113 P. (2d) 28 (Wash. 1941). The Wisconsin Employment
Peace Act, held constitutional by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, is now before the
United States Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. Hotel & Restaurant Employees
Int. Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 236 Wis. 329, 295 N. W. 634
(941), cert. granted, 1o U. S. L. W= 3111 (U. S. 1941). The Act makes it an
unfair labor practice for employees in a collective bargaining unit to picket or boycott
unless a majority of the unit has voted to call a strike. Another case, Opera on Tour
v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941), 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. lO9, where
NOTE
CONCLUSION
When the cases are examined, the difference in theories does not neces-
sarily bring different results. In some cases the identification of picketing
with free speech has brought no departure from the existing law while in
other instances changes are evident. Peaceful picketing is no longer illegal
per se. Nor has the ambit of permissible picketing in any case been limited
to controversies where there is an immediate employer-employee dispute.
The no-strike, no-picketing rule no longer obtains, thus relieving the courts
of the necessity of determining when a strike begins and when it ends. And
in cases where the objective of the union is to obtain an all-union shop, or
to induce the employer to breach his contract with a rival union, injunctions
were refused whether the employer or other employees sue. Picketing of
a sole proprietor in order to further the interest of the union was allowed
in all the recent cases decided thus far. And finally there seems to be indi-
cation of a tendency to clothe other forms of concerted labor activity with
constitutional immunity.
In addition to determining what result should obtain in the particu-
lar controversy, a second problem arises as to who shall decide the issue.
Examination of the theories used by the state courts throws this question
into bold relief. For by identifying picketing with free speech, the Court
has very conveniently extended its power of judicial review over the statu-
tory and common law of the states on the subject of picketing. The cases
show that the Supreme Court has not yet made it clear in what instances
they are going to control local policy and in what situations they are going
to leave the question of policy in labor disputes for the states to decide.
It is submitted that in the long run the more important problem is
one of maintaining "the balance of our federal system." The Court, there-
fore, must define more precisely the boundaries of state power "with zealous
regard for the guaranties of the Bill of Rights", and at the same time must
show "due recognition of the powers belonging to the states." 119
JP. J.B.
the union was inducing a strike in order to eliminate a labor saving device, was denied
review because the federal question was not necessarily decided below. io U. S. L.
W=EK 3117 (U. S. 1941). The dissent in that case and the one following it, American
Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 286 N. Y. 226, 36 N. E. (2d) 123 (194I), says
that to grant an injunction because the activity bears no reasonable relation to terms
or conditions of employment, violates the union's rights under the Constitution, and
maintains that only the Legislature can limit the permissible ambit of labor activity.
Compare Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 3o6 (1926), where the right to strike for the
purpose of collecting a stale claim due to a fellow member of the union was not a
right absolutely guaranteed by the Constitution. It might also be of value to point out
that in the Weber case, the majority said that the case does not deny the right to
strike. There should be no question of involuntary servitude in such cases because
the injunction is directed toward the officers and union as a group and not at the
individual members themselves.
119. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies Inc., 312
U. S. 287, 296 (1941).
